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The decision to incinerate hazardous industrial waste in cement plants (the so-
called ‘co-incineration’ process) gave rise to one of the most heated environmental
conflicts ever to take place in Portugal. The bitterest period was between 1997 and
2002, after the government had made a decision. Strong protests by residents,
environmental organizations, opposition parties, and some members of the
scientific community forced the government to backtrack and to seek scientific
legitimacy for the process through scientific expertise. The experts ratified the
government’s decision, stating that the risks involved were socially acceptable.
The conflict persisted over a decade and ended up clearing the way for a more
sustainable method over which there was broad social consensus – a multi-
functional method which makes it possible to treat, recover and regenerate most
wastes. Focusing the analysis on this conflict, this paper has three aims: (1) to
discuss the implications of the fact that expertise was ‘confiscated’ after the
government had committed itself to the decision to implement co-incineration and
by way of a reaction to the atmosphere of tension and protest; (2) to analyse the
uses of the notions of ‘risk’ and ‘uncertainty’ in scientific reports from both
experts and counter-experts’ committees, and their different assumptions about
controllability and criteria for considering certain practices to be sufficiently safe
for the public; and (3) to show how the existence of different technical scientific
and political attitudes (one more closely tied to government and the corporate
interests of the cement plants, the other closer to the environmental values of re-
use and recycling and respect for the risk perception of residents who challenged
the facilities) is closely bound up with problems of democratic legitimacy. This
conflict showed how adopting more sustainable and lower-risk policies implies a
broader view of democratic legitimacy, one which involves both civic movements
and citizens themselves.
Keywords: risks; knowledge strategies; hazardous waste
Introduction
Among environmental issues involving risk decisions, few have been more contentious
than the building of infrastructure for treating or disposing of waste, especially hazard-
ous waste.1 The literature published on episodes in this area and in different contexts
gives us a typical ‘anatomy’ of the phenomenon (Kasperson [2000] 2005). Aspects of
*Corresponding author. Email: jeronimo@iseg.utl.pt
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this anatomy include the adoption of a top-down ‘decide-announce-defend’ strategy,
the devaluing of local residents’ participation and risk perceptions, the lack of trust in
the organizations responsible for managing and monitoring the infrastructure,
geographical inequity in the distribution of risks and benefits, the potential for the loca-
tion to become stigmatized by the technology and failures in the procedural transpar-
ency of the process (e.g. Vari, Reagan-Cirincione, and Mumpower 1994; Petts 1994,
2004; Llurdés, Sauri, and Cerdan 2003; Kasperson, Golding, and Tuler [1992] 2005;
Botetzagias and Karamichas 2009).
Issues such as these, which are social in nature and tied to political values and
concerns, are often left out of serious consideration in the process of evaluation. It is
as if it were possible for certain technical and probabilistic disciplines to provide an
objective definition of risks and benefits on which subsequent political decisions can
be based. However, the number of unknowns (and unknown unknowns) surrounding
the area of environmental risk is usually quite large, arising from a number of
factors: unforeseen interactions, negative synergies, possible transgenerational
effects, long latency periods and causes which are difficult to perceive. These
aspects not only involve the technical side but the whole social context in which the
technology is to be implemented, and so further invalidate the use of probabilistic
calculations. That is why a broad understanding of environmental risks requires
knowledge of aspects which are contingent, including social aspects. In addition,
expert knowledge is itself based on certain social assumptions and values (Fischer
2009). Just as there is no reason to separate environmental risk assessment and the
study of social variables, so too it is impossible to deny that values are present in the
theory and practice of technological and scientific expertise. There is accordingly no
single appropriate strategy for dealing with environmental problems, based on domi-
nant or hegemonic shared assumptions. Rather, there are several possible scientific
and technological strategies.
This paper identifies the difficulties encountered in environmental risk decision-
making in the conflict which took place in Portugal over the incineration of hazardous
industrial waste (HIW) in cement kilns (known as the co-incineration method), the
longest and most acrimonious environmental conflict in the country’s history.2 This
particular case is notable for the fact that experts were only called in after the political
decision had been made and had unleashed a wave of protest, leading to a situation
where the government used expert advice in an attempt to justify and legitimize a
decision it had already taken. This was a conflict in which government and experts
became part of the HIW problem, rather than part of the solution. Their actions
exposed the false assumption that a decontextualized technological and scientific
strategy based solely on the statistical calculation of probability can take the place of
the political order, social needs, and values.
This conflict was in many ways similar to cases in other countries. It differed from
them in that the storm over the government’s decision to implement co-incineration,
involving local residents, government-appointed experts and counter-experts
supported by the protest movement, prompted the search for a more sustainable solu-
tion. In other words, the conflict cleared the way for an alternative HIW treatment
method which had not been thought of before – a multi-functional method which
allowed for greater social involvement, recognized the uncertainties, and was closer
to a post-normal science. The co-incineration case in Portugal can be used to argue
that scientific strategies are closely bound up with problems of democratic legitimacy.
Bringing together an approach which favours a reorientation of science to incorporate
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other types of knowledge, open up the field to alternative strategies and strengthen
citizens’ political capabilities (Funtowicz and Ravetz 1990; Wynne 1992; Lacey 1999,
2005) with the work of Tilly (2007) and Rosanvallon (2006; 2008) on restoring the
quality of democracy, this conflict can be said to have shown how adopting more
sustainable and lower-risk policies implies a broader view of democratic legitimacy,
one which involves both civic movements and citizens themselves.
Chronicle of a struggle foretold
The conflict over co-incineration was the most acutely contested, most widespread,
and most publicized phase in a long and fluctuating battle over the management of
HIW (for a chronology of the main events of the conflict, see Appendix 1). The
story began with the adoption of externally designed environmental policies and
directives after Portugal had joined the European Economic Community in 1985–
1986. Until then there had been no adequate system for managing and eliminating
wastes. They piled up illegally in open-air dumps or were emptied into rivers and
watercourses. Political parties from left and right formed successive governments,
each sponsoring a different method for dealing with the chaotic waste situation –
particularly that of industrial waste – given its potentially harmful effects on health
and the environment.
The decision to implement co-incineration in cement kilns was taken by a PS
(Socialist Party, member of the European Socialist Group) government, on the basis
of two arguments: ‘technological developments in recent years’ and the ‘favourable
cost–benefit analysis, both for the nation’s industry and for the environment’ (Reso-
lution of the Council of Ministers 98/97 of 25 June). According to the government,
co-incineration could be implemented quickly and cheaply. Moreover, the cement kilns
would eliminate HIW more efficiently because they operated at extremely high temper-
atures, and used fewer natural resources (fossil fuels and primary raw materials), since
the waste would replace part of the coal usually used for fuel in producing cement, up
to a maximum of 25%. These advantages of the co-incineration method meshed with
the private interests of a significant economic power centre in Portugal, the cement
plants, which saw in the method a way of saving money and obtaining revenue in an
area in which they normally incur costs.
The choice of cement plants (both in the Centre region), based on an Environmental
Impact Assessment (EIA) drawn up by the interested party in the case (the cement
sector), was justified by the need to improve the environment in the areas surrounding
the two cement plants and their central location in relation to waste producers. Strong
protests by local residents ensued, giving rise to a disconnect between what was
purported to be a public policy to solve the problem of HIW and the trust networks
created by civic movements, environmental associations, local government officials,
and university lecturers.
The protests were particularly strong in one of the areas, near Coimbra, the most
important city in the Centre region which is home to one of the oldest universities in
Europe. This local opposition movement came primarily from a working-class neigh-
bourhood, but a significant part of its support base was made up of professors and
researchers from the university, whose academic position enabled them to articulate
the reasons for the protest. The national government was accused of ignoring criti-
cisms which had been made in public hearings, for not knowing how much hazardous
waste was to be incinerated (because there was no accurate inventory of this type of
D
o
w
n
lo
ad
ed
 B
y:
 [
B-
on
 C
on
so
rt
iu
m 
- 
20
07
] 
At
: 
16
:3
9 
7 
Ju
ne
 2
01
1
4  H.M. Jerónimo and J.L. Garcia
waste) and for having, ‘in connivance with’ the cement plants, been socially unfair in
its choice of locations for implementation, because these areas had smaller populations
and fewer voters. Alongside these charges against the government, the residents of
those places reacted to a plan which they saw as bringing their neighbourhood into
disrepute, carrying risks for the environment and for public health. They feared atmo-
spheric emissions of dioxin, the possibility of an industrial or road traffic accident and
the dangers arising from heavy lorries carrying toxic waste as they travelled through
towns and villages.
This strong opposition led the government to react and to seek legitimacy. The
government was reluctant to reveal its ‘political agenda’ of forcing co-incineration,
but the protest movement succeeded in making it redirect the debate to discussion of
alternative options for handling HIW and adopt an approach involving a degree of
proximity and interaction with its opponents. It was only as a result of this protest that
the government resorted to scientific expertise, with two committees being established
(one biochemical and the other medical) with the task of assessing the method’s risks
to public health and to the environment. Both reached the conclusion, although not
unanimously, that the risks were socially acceptable, but their favourable attitude to
co-incineration and the explanations they gave were not enough to end the protests.
Despite the fact that local residents and cooperative movements took a significant
part in public hearings on the reports of the committee of experts, their specific criti-
cisms were not taken into account. The experts regarded them either as something
which was beyond the remit of their investigation, or as being tainted by local preju-
dice and/or technically unsound. Neither the government nor the experts took into
account the fact that, for residents, those arguing in favour of the method (the co-
incineration) were the same bodies which had earlier consistently acquiesced in the
contamination of their environment, and whose power of persuasion was therefore nil.
Cement plants were blamed for having caused pollution for decades, and for not
having listened to the concerns of local residents. The government was criticized for
a past situation in which public bodies had failed to ensure prevention and oversight.
There was a lack of trust in the cement plants and the government, following
decades of complaints being ignored, and an increasingly strong presence of what we
have chosen to call ‘pollution trauma’, freely adopting an idea of Jeffrey Alexander
et al. (2004).3 In this context, the counter-proposal offering environmental improve-
ment (which was unquestionably needed, given the extent to which the locations
involved had suffered environmental damage) was seen as a form of blackmail to get
local residents on board. Since the identity of the local community had been built on
the continuous experience of living next to a source of pollution, it could be regarded
as a ‘contaminated community’ (Edelstein [1988] 2004). Even though ‘pollution
trauma’ was always omnipresent in this community, the disposition to accept what
they saw as a feared and undesirable facility meant that the stigma of pollution could
no longer be ignored, and that a new narrative of community identity emerged in its
wake. The networks formed by doctors, scientists, members of civic and environ-
mental associations, who acted as counter-experts and had the discursive ability to
persuade the public sphere of the legitimacy of residents’ protests, were of funda-
mental importance in the construction of this narrative and for giving meaning to the
‘trauma’.
The government which had tried to implement the co-incineration method was
defeated in 2001, and this meant its chosen method was suspended. The new govern-
ment, led by the PSD (the Social Democratic Party, a member of the European
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People’s Party) changed its stance under popular pressure and announced a new
method which responded to the environmentalists’ concerns and favoured recovery,
recycling and specific treatment for each type of waste. This change of stance was also
supported by the data in a thorough inventory, commissioned from six Portuguese
universities, which concluded that the quantities of HIW produced annually in
Portugal were after all too small to justify the co-incineration option. The new method
put forward in 2003 was for multi-functional centres which, inspired by a recovery,
re-use and recycling (3Rs) policy, could apply differentiated forms of treatment to 80–
90% of HIW produced annually. These multi-functional centres started operating in
2008, the whole process involving far less conflict than had been the case with co-
incineration. The mayor of a certain district which had successful prior experience of
a waste treatment site was happy for these centres to be built in a sparsely populated
part of his district. Co-incineration, which turned out to be needed for only the 10%
of waste which could not be treated at these centres, is operating in both cement plants,
although in one of them (near Coimbra) the process had to await a court ruling,
because the local council and local residents took out an injuction to stop it.
Let us now look at the factors which lay behind the long standoff in the conflict
over co-incineration in Portugal.
Expertise ex machina
When mechanisms having a strong environmental impact are being implemented, and
there is an attitude which is favourable to public participation and observance of laws
which protect it, expert opinion should be consulted before any decision is taken. The
literature, however, shows that one of the strongest reasons why politicians call on
expertise is its potential role in legitimising political decisions which have already
been taken or are already planned (Nelkin 1971; Mazur 1973; Nowotny 1982;
Collingridge and Reeve 1986; Barker and Peters 1993). Many other political purposes
may lie behind the resort to expertise: delaying or avoiding a popular protest; covering
up a reversal of a decision (without the authorities having to acknowledge their
mistake or to admit that they changed their mind); mediating in a conflict (Boehmer-
Christiansen 1995, 197–8) or redefining political and social problems in purely tech-
nical terms. In some circumstances, policy makers may manipulate, distort or ignore
scientific sources and take decisions that fit their existing institutional policies and
goals (Primack and von Hippel 1974; Liberatore 1993; Alam 2005). This may happen
if the politicians in charge fail to mention the conditional nature of certain scientific
pronouncements, or select only those conclusions which suit them (Godard et al.
2002, 60–1). In some cases, the decision is copied entirely from expert opinions in an
attempt to evade responsibility for the consequences of conflict-laden or difficult
choices, and to depoliticize the decision-making process (Larson 1984, 63–4). In
others, expertise is an organized mechanism for integrating technological and
scientific innovation (Roy 2001).
In the Portuguese conflict, no expert advice was sought before the political decision
was taken to go ahead with co-incineration in certain locations. The decision was based
on an EIA drawn up by those who put forward the scheme. The committee of experts
was only summoned after the public announcement of the government’s decision and
the outbreak of protest, with a view to seeking a posteriori legitimacy and justification
for a decision it had already taken. This posture is an example of what is known in the
literature as ‘confiscation’ of expertise (Roqueplo 1997). In the interviews carried out
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6  H.M. Jerónimo and J.L. Garcia
for this study, this point was mentioned by many interviewees, both members of the
scientific committees and opponents of the scheme. 
[The government] (…) had to find a way out somewhere, so they found it in science. And
for a few months things were calm, quiet. But I think it was a politically artful way out,
and not a matter of scientific conviction (…). (Interviewee A, see Appendix 2)
(…) the government used the device of a scientific committee, not because it had any
merit in itself, but as a way of trying to anaesthetize the opposition (…). (Interviewee B,
see Appendix 2)
This placed the committee of experts under great public and political scrutiny and
pressure, irredeemably damaging its credibility and independence. The expert
committee’s focus on an analysis of co-incineration, to the detriment of an equal focus
on other treatment methods, gave further encouragement to the idea that everything
had been arranged so that the scientific report would ratify the decision which the
government had already taken.
Along with this criticism of parameters went the idea that the choice of members
of the committee had been strongly influenced by the government, even though,
according to the legislation which established the committee, it was the top body of
the Portuguese universities (the Council of Vice-Chancellors) which was responsible
for those choices. According to critics, this Council had merely provided a list of
names from which the government had been free to choose. The government had not
only chosen to set up the committee, but it had also played a key role in deciding who
should be on it. The choice of experts is not a neutral process. In her detailed study of
several American advisory committees, Jasanoff observed that ‘advisers are selected
with an eye to much more than merely technical qualifications’ and that the ‘selection
criteria are tailored to fit the function an expert is expected to perform’ (1990, 93). The
choice of members of advisory committees, involving scientists with specific disci-
plinary and institutional affiliations, is clearly the outcome of the government’s objec-
tives, which seek to confine the activities of such committees to certain scientific
procedures and thereby define the way the issues are addressed.
In the Portuguese conflict, the membership of the committee is open to criticism
for being drawn from a narrow range of disciplines. On the other hand, the presence
of a Coimbra academic who became the chairman was a sign of impartiality which the
government and the other members of the committee wished to convey to the scheme’s
opponents – the city of Coimbra being close to the location of one of the selected
cement plants. It could be argued that to have selected an ‘insider’ as chairman might
offer an additional assurance that if a local expert were not opposed to the plan, then
there would be no grounds for fear and suspicion. 
In the committee’s hearing in Coimbra, [I was asked] ‘could the plan affect my son and
myself?’ and I said: ‘Look, I live in Coimbra. So you at least know that, let’s say, I’m
not suggesting something against myself’ (…). (Interviewee A, see Appendix 2)
It is highly significant that the committee’s report was to be of a binding nature. It
was not confined, as is normally the case, to an advisory and scenario-building role.
The responsibility for the decision was thus transferred to the sphere of expertise,
which means that decision-making was delegated and that the backdrop to the prob-
lem was seen as being located in technology-based rationality. The fact that the
D
o
w
n
lo
ad
ed
 B
y:
 [
B-
on
 C
on
so
rt
iu
m 
- 
20
07
] 
At
: 
16
:3
9 
7 
Ju
ne
 2
01
1
Journal of Risk Research  7
government arranged for the committee’s expert opinion to be binding showed that it
believed the decision on HIW should be a technical one and that it should be left
exclusively to specialists in the fields of chemical engineering, air quality and medi-
cine. The technical nature of the solution envisaged is reinforced by the fact that the
committee contained no social scientists, no ecologists, no specialists in environmen-
tal ethics and no citizen representatives: its members worked solely in the natural and
medical sciences.4
It is understandable that politicians should seek to base decisions affecting whole
communities on technical knowledge rather than being guided merely by their politi-
cal convictions. But it should be emphasized once again that the committee of experts
was summoned as part of a broader strategy which, beyond seeking technical advice
or even the resolution of the conflict once and for all, sought to demobilize the resi-
dents and counter the arguments of the opposition. With this step, the government
made an apparent effort to withdraw its earlier commitment to the decision it had
already taken, albeit at the cost of delegating to others that which was properly its own
responsibility.
Given that the experts allowed themselves to be part of a process which had
already been largely sketched out in advance, it seems appropriate to think of them as
‘expertise ex machina’, which is brought in to ‘deal with’ a difficult situation of
tension between government and the political parties, environmental associations,
local civic organizations, councils affected by the decision and a part of the scientific
community. In other words, the proposal to set up a committee of experts after the
decision had been announced and protests had erupted has some resonance with
ancient Greek and Roman theatre, in which an outside force or unexpected event was
needed to resolve a complicated and apparently insoluble problem, or a manoeuvre
that had not been properly prepared.
Placing the problems in the context of ‘risk’ or ‘uncertainty’
Because they were binding in terms of the political decision and because they complied
with what the government had already decided, the experts’ reports (Formosinho et al.
2000) became the main focus of study and opposition from some members of the
scientific community, who thus allied themselves with the chorus of protest from local
residents, opposition parties and civic and environmental associations.
In both reports, the notion of risk is a core concept, formulated on the basis of a
calculation of probabilities. The historical origins of this idea lie in the conjunction of
a modernist rejection of determinism, the definition of man as a free and rational being,
and the prestige which the laws of probability acquired over the course of the nineteenth
century. In rationalizing modernity, the West gradually devalued the idea that human
life is shaped by such arbitrary forces as luck or destiny, and opened up the space for
man’s rational action and procedures to forecast and anticipate events, thereby ‘domes-
ticating’ chance in all areas of individual and collective life (Gigerenzer et al. 1989;
Hacking 1990). That which the historical literature calls the emergence of statistical
and probabilistic reasoning (Hacking 1975; Porter 1986; Krüger et al. 1987; Cohen
2005) expresses science’s quest to overcome the contingency inherent in human life
by means of mathematical measurement. But this effort to tame the random has not
only failed to prevent it appearing in the modern world in other forms, but has also
given rise to radical uncertainty. Early in the twentieth century, Frank Knight (1921)
and John Maynard Keynes (1921) saw that economic life is beset by wide margins of
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‘uncertainty’, and that these cannot be done away with by applying more information
or more science, nor can they be reduced to the mere probabilistic calculus of risk. Even
so, the concept of uncertainty was marginalized or absorbed into the generic classifi-
cation of risk which came to dominate the second half of the twentieth century (Martins
1997–1998). That dominant view also implied that other forms of uncertainty such as
‘ignorance’ and ‘indeterminacy’ were devalued. We use ‘ignorance’ here in the sense
suggested by Brian Wynne (1992), whenever we are faced with a situation of unknown
consequences and failure to acknowledge the limitations and compromises of scientific
knowledge itself. We use ‘indeterminacy’ when the uncertainties deriving from the
existence of contingent social behaviour create a situation in which it is acknowledged
that scientific assessments are the outcome of a particular definition of the problem
and that this definition is influenced by social, political and scientific choices (Wynne
1992, 114–19).
The conceptual distinction between ‘risk’, ‘uncertainty’, ‘ignorance’ and ‘inde-
terminacy’ assists in understanding the committee’s reports and its opponents’ criti-
cisms. Overall, those in favour of co-incineration stressed the benefits of the method,
and argued that the risks could be effectively monitored and controlled. They
concluded that the risks were acceptable on the basis of existing knowledge (which
states that there are no additional emissions), and the fact that the method repre-
sented an opportunity for putting an end to the illegal dumping of HIW or its inciner-
ation under uncontrolled conditions. The absence of conclusive empirical evidence
as to the harmful nature of a particular phenomenon tended to be interpreted in a
positive way, and this meant that ‘ignorance’ was equated to absence of risk. This
assumption can be seen in the words of one of the members of the committee of
experts: 
(…) based on previous experience, of several decades of operation in over 100 cement
plants in Europe using (…) alternative fuels [HIW], there are (…) no reports of accidents
related to this … If that is so, then this is (…) proof that the risk is low. So, we don’t even
need to conceptualize here, all we need to do is to check the facts, the history of what
has actually happened. (Interviewee C, see Appendix 2)
It is not unusual to find this type of conclusion. In a case study concerning the
siting of a waste incinerator facility in Portsmouth, Hampshire (southern England),
analysed by Judith Petts, one of the experts in thermal combustion, who was familiar
with the incineration process, said ‘if there was a problem with dioxins we would
already know about it’ (1997, 371). Here too the method’s supporters assumed that it
was safe, based on the lack of scientific evidence of any problems. This is what Beck
calls the ‘technocratic fallacy’, whereby that which has not been studied, or cannot be
studied, is assumed to be harmless ([1986] 1992, 66).
Opponents of co-incineration saw the confidence which the Portuguese expert
committees showed in the safety of the method and of the residents who lived near the
cement plants as being based on false assumptions. In contrast, they argued for the
precautionary principle and for safeguarding local residents, given the inconclusive
nature of the studies, the prevailing ignorance of the synergistic effects of pollutants,
scientific doubts, the lack of consensus on many of the effects of exposure to dioxins
and other polluting gases, the very broad margins of uncertainty deriving from long
latency periods and opacity of the risks involved, and the fact that it was impossible
to ensure absolute control. As an example of the testimony gathered in the various
interviews with scientists who were against the method, the following quote came
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from one of the doctors who rejected the committee’s optimism and recalled the
frequent kiln failures in the cement plants: 
(…) if the cement plants always operated under ideal conditions, the risk would be
minimal. But everyone knows that the cement plants are always having problems with
the kilns, and when they do (…), the burn rate is inadequate, and enormous amounts of
waste are pumped into the atmosphere. (…) the whole rationale of the expert committee
was based on ideal operating conditions. (Interviewee D, see Appendix 2)
The underlying assumptions regarding operating conditions and accident preven-
tion depended on 100% correct operation. This is unlikely, considering the history of
the environmental record of the cement plants and the state’s efforts at control. In
other words, they relied on the complete absence of contingencies, trouble, faults and
‘surprises’ in the process. The assumptions may be technically correct, but they are
not achievable from the social point of view. This is because, as is inherent in the
concept of indeterminacy, technological risks relate not simply to the technology
itself, but to the whole social system used to implement it. An excerpt from the
report of the Committee Against Co-Incineration (CLCCI in Portuguese) illustrates
this: 
Is it not legitimate to assume that co-incineration may not operate within normal limits,
especially if you remember that the cement plants were not built for burning HIW, that
they were built years ago, at a time when environmental concerns were minimal, that for
technical reasons pollutants like dioxin can only very rarely be measured on a yearly
basis, that the law allows for the relaxation of controls at certain times, that there are
often much greater pollution discharges when starting up and closing down, that there
may be an accident, and that plants habitually get away with everything in the climate of
total lack of control which prevails in our country? (CLCCI 2000)
In order to ensure that such risks did not arise, the expert committees put forward
technical solutions such as monitoring emission levels, the prior treatment of waste
before incineration and active epidemiological surveillance. This last suggestion
ended up being boycotted by the residents themselves, who refused to take on the
costs of uncertainty and to be exposed to a source of contamination before an assess-
ment of its toxicity had been made. Likewise co-incineration tests, which sought to
determine that the co-incineration method was harmless, were discounted by oppo-
nents, on account of the lack of openness in their procedures, both because residents
were not told that the tests were about to start, and because, according to environmen-
talists, the tests were carried out under ‘ideal’ conditions.
In addition to the lack of procedural transparency, the government’s decision to
implement co-incineration in cement plants was interpreted by opponents as a sign of
having given in to technocratic and economic arguments, in particular the cement
plant lobby and opinions which favoured the continuing pursuit of an unsustainable
economic development model. Only in this way could one understand, so the oppo-
nents said, why the government had chosen an end-of-line method5 (incineration),
instead of giving priority to 3Rs. However, to do the politicians justice, it can be
argued that co-incineration seemed to them to be compatible with a 3Rs policy, and
above all as a means of solving an old and pressing problem: how to treat the huge
quantities of HIW which had been accumulating for decades, how to avoid illegal
dumping and exports and how to make the country autonomous and self-sufficient in
dealing with its wastes. Underlying its position was the convincing fact that it was a
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method which had already been tried in richer European countries with greater
environmental demands, such as Germany, Austria, Belgium and France.
Networks of opposition to co-incineration, for their part, argued that co-
incineration was the wrong solution for a number of reasons. First, because scientific
knowledge is not reliable enough to ensure that the method is harmless. Second,
because it might delay or even discourage the promotion of a 3Rs policy. Finally,
because they suspected that, given the lack of transparency which had attended the
whole process, the burden of permissiveness previously observed in the cement plants,
and their interest in HIW as an energy source, the plant operators would quickly turn
co-incineration into a kind of ‘black hole’ for wastes which might be better treated in
more sustainable ways.
Linking research strategies to democratic legitimacy
In the co-incineration conflict in Portugal, the stark opposition between expert commit-
tees summoned by the government and counter-experts supported by protest move-
ments against the scheme revolved around an epistemological and methodological
conflict. The counter-experts tried to overturn the experts’ conclusions by exposing the
reports’ errors, contradictions, limitations, and lack of technical accuracy. The conflict
also embodied a struggle between scientific strategies, based on the existence of poten-
tial alternatives. Both co-incineration and multi-functional centres are technical meth-
ods, but different assumptions underlie each method. What can be done with wastes
incinerated in cement kilns is not the same as what can be done with wastes which are
treated differently with the aim of reusing and recycling them as much as possible.
Choice of an end-of-line method like co-incineration in turn could make it impossible
to look for alternative methods. Exploring the possibilities which waste offers thus
depends on the relative emphasis placed on certain values and the strategic priorities
of scientific research.
The guiding principles which permeate the expert committees’ reports reflect a
strategy based on abstract categorization and laws governing natural phenomena,
expressed in mathematical form, regardless of their connections with human experi-
ence and social, moral, human and environmental values. This kind of strategy does
not provide for the specific nature of the social context and local experience, because
it separates the events themselves, and knowledge of them, from the practical experi-
ence of life, from values and from the social milieu. Linking solutions of this type to
the competitive requirements of a deregulated global economy has been the domi-
nant principle, guiding the actions of various types of authority and preventing any
search for multifaceted solutions. A good illustration of this is the fact that the politi-
cal decision in the co-incineration case was oblivious to the reality that the method
was going to be implemented in the midst of a community which had long experi-
ence of contamination from cement-based pollution and of complaints not being
listened to.
Since the solution to the problem of HIW had to be technically effective as well as
socially and politically legitimate, it would have been appropriate to explore other
possibilities for waste treatment by tying them in to concrete local sensitivities and
experiences, citizen participation, and the ecological and social context. Concepts
such as ‘post-normal science’ (Funtowicz and Ravetz 1990), scientific knowledge
based on ‘alternative strategies’ (Lacey 1999) and the ‘preventive paradigm’ (Wynne
1992) are aimed at reconstructing science in order to emphasize the distinction
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between risk and uncertainty in environmental crisis scenarios, and acknowledge the
need for citizens to be involved, for different approaches and methodologies, and for
a commitment to values. In all of them we find elements which have previously been
left out of the cognitive and methodological parameters of traditional science: differ-
ent types of uncertainty (including cumulative impacts, hidden interdependencies,
mechanical and human error), ethical and social variables, increasing civic capability.
All these are ways of seeing science not as a simple cumulative record of experience
or even a neutral procedure for dispelling ignorance, but as a construct which is
informed by different theoretical and methodological assumptions, constant rework-
ings, shifts, emerging complexities and renewal of ignorance.
Using multiple strategies, where each one identifies a particular type of possibility,
enables us to grasp phenomena in a holistic way. And because the issue at stake has
repercussions on all our lives, the decision on which strategies to use has to be nego-
tiated in the framework of democratic institutions. To this end, co-incineration might
be part of a viable and balanced strategy for handling HIW. But the complexity of the
problem of wastes demands much more than the simple implementation of this
method on its own, and it is very unlikely to be the main or only destination for those
wastes. The publicly accepted objective of the minimization of ecological damage and
health risks would seem to demand also that the production of wastes be reduced, that
those which can be re-used and recycled should be, that industrial production
processes be modernized by installing more environmentally friendly technologies,
and that there should be supervision and control to ensure compliance with rules. It
may be argued that the disciplines represented in the expert committees, which
included chemistry, chemical and environmental engineering and medicine, are the
‘hard core’ required to assess the co-incineration method. But given its social and
economic effects and the values at stake, it is something that cannot be explained and
understood using a decontextualized or single-discipline strategy. Other views need to
be taken into account, particularly those from the sciences of ecology, society and
alternative technologies. These might have prevented some of the errors made and
perhaps helped to reach different conclusions.
The solution adopted for management of HIW in Portugal ended up being a
more sustainable one, thanks to the pressure exerted on the holders of political
power by civic and environmental movements. Those who defended the public
interest, and advocated a sustainable future-oriented waste management policy,
were not the politicians, who should have played the part, but citizens who demon-
strated an ability to engage fully in public life and to become involved in the
making of decisions. The alliance of locally driven protests, civic movements and
pro-environment specialists became an arena for an apprenticeship in democracy.
Local residents’ protests began as reactions in defence of local interests, but they
subsequently acquired the ability to incorporate the public interest and had a nation-
wide impact.
This environmental conflict shows the crucial role that citizen participation can play
in defining more sustainable and lower-risk policies for dealing with technological
risks. In a broad comparative study of different historical periods of democratization
in different contexts (including Southern Europe and Portugal), Charles Tilly (2007)
suggests the concept of ‘low-capacity democratic’ to describe situations in which those
in political authority fail to protect the independence of the state and the common inter-
est against outside powers. This was what happened in Portugal, when political leaders
neglected to protect the general interest against the private interests of the major
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cement-producing and construction companies. The course of events was reversed
because citizenship, to use Tilly’s terms again, re-politicized democracy, revealing
civil society’s capacity for politics and safeguarding public policies. Successful citizen
mobilization to challenge politically deployed science and implement alternative solu-
tions established the possibility of civil society action, and changed the parameters for
future political conduct.
The importance of citizens engaging fully in public life ties in with Pierre
Rosanvallon’s (2006; 2008) ideas on increasing democratic legitimacy in our societies.
Against a backdrop of loss of legitimacy and confidence in the institutions of electoral
and representative democracy, because they so frequently fail to live up to their prom-
ises, citizens can be said to ‘express themselves’, ‘become involved’ and ‘intervene’.
They are no longer content merely to cast their vote. Activities through which society
exerts pressure on its rulers, were carried out transparently in open forums that engage
with the rulers’ arguments, should not be seen as anti-democratic, but rather as a correc-
tive to the failures of legitimacy in electoral democracy. Rosanvallon puts forward a
democracy which multiplies citizens’ capacities for action in the political system, based
on a democratic legitimacy in which proximity is the crucial element. Proximity,
Rosanvallon argues, requires that each situation be looked at in its specifics. For any
form of action, this implies taking contextual diversity into account. The co-incinera-
tion conflict was an example of one of the ways in which issues of democratic legiti-
macy run alongside different research strategies. To achieve greater democratic
legitimacy, the state should have negotiated with the trust networks of opponents of
the method, prevented inequalities arising and asserted independence vis-à-vis
economically powerful interests. In terms of research strategy, a solution to the prob-
lem of wastes would have demanded technical advice which took local residents’ sensi-
tivities into account, as well as the values of sustainability and social and economic
well-being.
Conclusion
A number of technical and scientific strategies come into play in debates and conflicts
over environmental risks, and these may be tied to different institutional choices and
socio-political approaches. When considering institutional aspects of the co-incinera-
tion conflict in Portugal, it is important to highlight the fact that scientific expertise
was called upon after the public announcement of the decision and the outbreak of
protests. This represents a reactive strategy in which the government made an apparent
effort to review its commitment to a decision it had already taken, at the cost of
delegating to others that which was properly its own responsibility. Expertise was thus
‘confiscated’, with the experts agreeing to be part of a process which had, to a great
extent, already been mapped out.
In relation to technical and scientific strategies, it was the protests and the mobili-
zation of a network of opposition which succeeded in repositioning the strategy
adopted by the committee of experts, whose remit had been defined by the govern-
ment. Their position in favour of co-incineration was based on the linkage between
technology and regulation of waste by market mechanisms (the cement companies);
on the equivalence of the ‘absence of conclusive evidence of harm’ and ‘conclusive
evidence of absence of harm’; and on the assumption that the whole system would
operate correctly and be properly controlled, if a limited range of complementary
measures were complied with. The technical and scientific strategy adopted by the
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scientists and environmentalists who were critical of the process was based on scenar-
ios involving unknowable factors and uncontrollable risks. They argued for clean
technologies and for the 3Rs, and for the involvement of local residents. They stressed
the epistemological inadequacy of science in relation to many significant aspects of
HIW incineration, particularly its harmful effects on public health, and how wrong it
was to assume that there would be ‘optimum’ control over a process which was
extremely complex both technically and socially, involving a whole network of
processing, storage, disposal and transportation facilities.
On the issue of democratic legitimacy, Portuguese governments had long been
unable to countenance the fact that there were ways of dealing with the HIW problem
other than co-incineration, and that different scientific and technical strategies could
be adopted to exploit these. The multi-functional centres (with co-incineration being
used for just a small portion of wastes) are a clear example of the existence of alter-
natives which reconciled a technical solution to HIW with the environmental values
of sustainability and the participation and well-being of local residents.
In addition to specific dynamics of the social and historical contexts in which they
occur, cases such as the co-incineration story in Portugal illustrate certain broader
trends involved in understanding and dealing with environmental and technological
risks and uncertainties. Especially important is the need for openness to a diversity of
scientific research strategies and technological practices, in that each strategy embod-
ies certain possible actions, which are then implemented (or not) according to the
interest and value attributed to them. Conflicts such as the one we have analysed here
reinforce the idea that different technical and scientific strategies are closely tied to
broad or narrow forms of democratic legitimacy. When faced with an environmental
crisis (and other types of problem), those with political responsibilities rely for guid-
ance on technological solutions which, moreover, do not require constant democratic
guidance and supervision for their implementation. This leads to a neglect of other
types of guidelines and alternative technological and scientific strategies, which might
be potentially more conducive to environmental sustainability and quality of life, as
opposed to being just economically viable.
The opinions and principles of politicians, experts and counter-experts cannot, in
reality, be separated from the scale of values which underpin their political or scien-
tific practices, and which give shape to particular worldviews and different concep-
tions of progress and development models. Nor can it be assumed that expertise
operates as a participation-stopper which, instead of strengthening democracy by
bringing citizens and rulers together, has the effect of increasing the distance between
them. Cases of the type presented in this article gain importance at a time when many
politicians and technical experts cite the scale of impending environmental problems,
the problems of voluntarily coordinating behavioural changes to counter these and the
frequency of ‘not-in-my-backyard’ reactions as reasons for imposing technological
solutions without public debate. Those with political responsibility often have great
difficulty in accepting that citizens may investigate and critique the technological
measures involved, and that scientists can join them in doing so. Many analyses of
contemporary society point to an environmental crisis which seems to go hand in hand
with a crisis of democratic participation. The need to deal with environmental risks
and uncertainties has led to a constructive encounter between a variety of alternative
scientific strategies and forms of democratic renewal. There is evidence that, when
these come together, holistic solutions can be found which are more in line with the
values of citizenship and sustainability.
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Notes
1. The designation ‘hazardous’ is given to waste products which contain substances which
may be harmful to human health and/or to the environment.
2. Further empirical data and aspects of the conflict over co-incineration in Portugal are
included and analysed elsewhere (Jerónimo 2007, 2010). In terms of methodology, this
case study draws on three types of sources: (1) documents used to reconstruct the history
of the conflict and to understand its longitudinal dynamics – legislation, transcripts of the
most important parliamentary debates, official documents of the government and of the
various parties involved, reports of the expert committees and reports produced by envi-
ronmental and civic associations; (2) 15 in-depth interviews were conducted with key
actors: members of the expert committees, counter-experts and politicians; and (3) we also
drew extensively on relevant newspaper reports published between 1996 and 2006 in the
main national newspapers (Público, Expresso, Jornal de Notícias and Diário de Notícias).
3. The idea of ‘pollution trauma’ is drawn from the concept of ‘cultural trauma’ (Alexander
et al. 2004) and seeks to express precisely the sense of collective identity, as well as the
common destiny, of those living close to the cement plants. As a cultural process (and not
a psychological or physical one), trauma derives from an event which leaves profound
marks on the collective memory and identity of any given community. For a more in-depth
approach to this concept, see Alexander et al. (2004).
4. It is not unusual for there to be failings and disciplinary gaps in the membership of this type
of scientific committee (e.g. Hilgartner 2000, 89ff).
5. ‘End-of-line’ methods, such as landfills and incineration, are final solutions, which come
after a 3Rs (reduction, re-use and recycling) policy has been tried. They treat the wastes
created by production, but do not change the process of production itself.
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Appendix 1. Main events in the co-incineration conflict.
1997 The PS government announces to the nation that it has decided to 
implement co-incineration in cement kilns. A ‘memorandum of 
understanding’ is signed between the Environment Ministry and the 
Portuguese cement industry.
1998 The cement-manufacturing group carries out an EIS which concludes 
in favour of co-incineration. The EIS is submitted for public 
enquiry. The outcome is hundreds of opinions, critiques and 
petitions.
1998 (December) The Environment Ministry announces that the cement plants of 
Maceira and Souselas have been chosen. Strong protests ensue. The 
Committee Against Co-incineration is established (Comissão de 
Luta contra a Co-Incineração [CLCCI])
1999 The prime minister announces the setting up of an independent 
committee of experts. Subsequently Parliament suspends the 
decision on co-incineration until the committee’s conclusions are 
known.
2000 The experts’ committee’s report concludes in favour of co-
incineration and suggests Outão and Souselas as locations. A new 
wave of popular protest follows. Controversy between experts and 
counter-experts over the report. Co-incineration is again suspended, 
and a medical committee is established.
2000 (December) The medical committee’s report concludes in favour of implementing 
co-incineration.
2001 (January-March) Two counter-experts’ reports are submitted. They conclude that there 
is a greater incidence of certain pathologies associated with 
environmental factors in Souselas.
2001 Public debate over the reports of the two scientific experts’ 
committees. The Environment Ministry receives almost 12,000 
critical comments.
2002 (March) The new (PSD/CDS) government suspends all plans for co-
incineration as well as the two experts’ committees.
2002 (May) The results of a government-commissioned inventory of the quantities 
and types of (ordinary and hazardous) waste produced in Portugal 
are made public. This inventory concludes that the quantities of HIW 
produced in the country do not justify the co-incineration option.
2003 The PSD-CDS government announces a new method for treating 
HIW: the CIRVER.
Appendix 2. Coded names and functions of the interviewees.
Coded name Function
A Chemical engineer and chairman of the experts’ committee
B Mechanical engineer, environmentalist and opponent of co-incineration
C Chemical engineer, expert in atmospheric pollution and member of the 
experts’ committee
D Doctor and opponent of co-incineration
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